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Abstract
With the advent of functional brain imaging techniques and recent developments in the analysis of
cortical connectivity, the focus of mental imagery studies has shifted from a semi-modular approach
to an integrated cortical network perspective. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of visual
imagery of faces and objects show that activation of content-specific representations stored in the
ventral visual stream is top-down-modulated by parietal and frontal regions. Recent findings in
patients with conscious awareness disorders reveal that mental imagery can be used to map patterns
of residual cognitive function in their brain and to provide diagnostic and prognostic indicators.
Introduction and context
Visual imagery is the ability to generate percept-like
images in the absence of retinal input and is therefore a
vivid demonstration of retrieving pictorial information
from memory. Psychophysical and brain imaging studies
have demonstrated functional similarities between
visual perception and visual imagery to the extent that
common mechanisms appear to be activated by both
[1-4]. Numerous neuroimaging studies have shown that
visual imagery, like visual perception, evokes activation
in occipito-parietal and occipito-temporal visual associa-
tion areas [5,6]. In some studies, the primary visual
cortex [7,8] was activated during imagery, suggesting that
the generation of mental images may involve sensory
representations at the earlier processing stages in the
visual pathway. Studies of patients with brain damage
have demonstrated a dissociation of visual-object and
visual-spatial imagery [9], indicating that different parts
of the visual system mediate ‘where’ and ‘what’ imagery,
a dissociation that parallels the two anatomically distinct
visual systems proposed for visual perception [10].
Single-unit recordings in epileptic patients revealed that
neurons in the human medial temporal lobe fired
selectively during both visual perception and visual
imagery, suggesting that the neurons activated during
storage of incoming visual input are later reactivated
during the mnemonic retrieval [11].
Although many studies have focused on the overlap and
similarities between perception and imagery, the sub-
jective experiences of imagining and seeing are clearly
very different. The intriguing case study of CK, a patient
with severe visual agnosia who cannot recognize objects
but can draw them with considerable details from
memory, suggests that visual imagery can be dissociated
from visual perception [12]. It has also been shown that
during visual imagery, deactivation in auditory cortex is
negatively correlated with activation in visual cortex and
with the score of subjective vividness of visual imagery,
suggesting that in order to generate vivid mental
images, the brain needs to filter out irrelevant sensory
information [13].
Where bottom-up meets top-down
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
have reported that within the ventral pathway, faces and
other objects, such as outdoor scenes, houses, animals,
and tools, have distinct representations [14,15]. In parti-
cular, it has been shown that faces, houses, and chairs
evoke highly consistent patterns of neural responses in
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tion is observed in extrastriate cortex during visual and
tactile recognition of faces and man-made objects in
sighted subjects and during tactile recognition in blind
subjects [18], suggesting that more abstract features of
object form are represented in the visual ventral stream.
Inspired by the consistent topology of the response to
faces, houses, and chairs, a series of studies were
conducted to investigate whether visual imagery of
these objects would evoke content-related activation
within the same ventral regions that are activated during
perception [19,20]. Content-related activation during
imagery was found in temporal cortex (e.g., imagery of
faces activated the lateral fusiform gyrus, whereas
imagery of houses activated the medial fusiform gyrus),
but this activity was restricted to small subsets of the
regions that were activated during perception [19,20].
Moreover, visual imagery of faces and objects evoked
activity in parietal and frontal cortex, suggesting that
content-related activation during imagery is mediated by
the retrieval of face and object representations from long-
term memory and their maintenance in the ‘mind’s eye’
[19,20]. Analysis of effective connectivity revealed that
during visual perception, category-selective patterns of
activation in extrastriate cortex are mediated by content-
sensitive forward connections from early visual areas
[21,22]. In contrast, during visual imagery, category-
selective activation is mediated by content-sensitive
backward connections from prefrontal cortex, suggesting
that neuronal interactions between occipito-temporal,
parietal, and frontal regions are task- and stimulus-
dependent. Additionally, non-selective, top-down pro-
cesses, originating in superior parietal areas, contribute
to the generation of mental images, regardless of their
content, and their maintenance through visual imagery
[22]. Similar findings were reported in a study of motion
imagery, which found activation in a network composed
of motion-sensitive regions (human middle temporal/
V5 complex) and prefrontal areas (frontal eye field and
Brodmann area [BA] 9/46) [23]. It therefore seems that
mental imagery is a dynamic cognitive function that
engages distributed cortical networks activated during
the allocation of attention and retrieval from memory.
Interestingly, recent studies of art perception have shown
that when confronted with abstract and indeterminate
paintings, viewers use mental imagery and contextual
associations to understand the content of these art
compositions [24,25]. These novel findings indicate that
visual imagery is an essential cognitive ability required
not only for anticipating and retrieving information from
memory but, importantly, for comprehending the world
around us.
Major recent advances
Imagery in patients with conscious awareness disorders
Recent studies in vegetative state patients have discov-
ered normal patterns of activation in their brain during
mental imagery. When a young woman in a vegetative
state was asked to imagine playing tennis or to navigate
her way around her house, significant activity was
observed in her brain, similar to the activity in the
brain of healthy volunteers performing the same tasks
(Figure 1) [26,27]. These surprising findings suggest that
vegetative state patients retain the ability to understand
verbal instructions and to carry out mental tasks in
response to those instructions, namely to exhibit willed,
voluntary behavior in the absence of any overt action.
Mental imagery can therefore be used as a neural proxy
for behavior in order to assess the degree of conscious-
ness in non-communicative brain-damaged patients and
perhaps predict their recovery [28]. A recent study has
shown that the precuneus, which mediates memory-
related imagery [19,29], is also activated during hypnosis,
suggesting that such a state of enhanced self-monitoring
is achieved by control of motor responses by internal
representations [30]. Thus, understanding the neural
mechanisms of mental imagery could have far-reaching
implications for understanding conscious awareness and
its various disorders.
Figure 1. Brain activity in a healthy subject and a vegetative state
patient
Neural activation during imagining playing tennis (to convey ‘Yes’ responses)
and imagining moving from room to room in the home (to convey ‘No’
responses). The similar patterns of neural activation suggest that some
patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state have activity that
reflects awareness and cognition. Adapted from Monti et al., 2010 [36],
courtesy of Adrian Owen.
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Recent developments in deciphering the mental chrono-
metry [31] and functional and effective connectivity
during spatial imagery [32] suggest hierarchical temporal
dynamics within the imagery network. The use of
classifiers for decoding mental states [33] and predictive
coding models [34] would enable additional insights
into the neural mechanisms of both perception and
mental imagery. Understanding the neuronal interac-
tions among visual, parietal, and prefrontal regions has
far-reaching clinical implications, reinforced by the fact
that vegetative state patients show healthy patterns of
brain activation during mental imagery which reflect will
and intention, the hallmark of conscious awareness.
Identifying residual cognitive function in such patients
by means of fMRI and electroencephalogram can be used
not only for diagnosis and prognosis but perhaps also as
a form of communication with patients who lack speech
or the motor act of expression [35,36]. Hopefully, in the
near future, combining cutting-edge analytic techniques
will enable clinicians to make accurate predictions about
the recovery of non-communicative brain-damaged
patients.
Abbreviation
fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging.
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